L'hymne est, par excellence, le genre litteraire par lequel s'est operee la fusion entre christianisme et hellenisme, et d'ou paganisme et monotheisme se cotoient. Il revenait a Synesios de Cyrene, ce chretien platonisant, de participer a cette synthese: ne dans l'antique colonie grecque de Cyrene aux alentours de 370, il recoit tout d'abord une culture classique, selon le gout de l'epoque, avant de se tourner, sans pour autant renier l'hellenisme et la philosophie, vers le christianisme. A l'heure ou le monotheisme (...) commence a supplanter le polytheisme, ou Byzance prend le pas sur Rome, Synesios tente de creer un lien entre les deux traditions, notamment par le biais de son action politique, comme l'ambassade a Constantinople. La presente edition regroupe en un volume, les 9 hymnes de Synesios auxquels est ajoute l'hymne 10, sans doute apocryphe. La longue introduction presente la periode historique, riche, complexe, et trop peu connue, ainsi que l'auteur. Une notice generale fait le point sur le texte lui-meme, le genre de l'hymne et la tradition manuscrite. Chaque hymne est en outre precede d'une breve notice analysant la composition, la metrique et proposant de judicieuses pistes de lecture. Des notes accompagnent le texte et sont developpees, en fin d'ouvrage, par des notes complementaires. Le livre est encore enrichi par un Index verborum. (shrink)

“Articulate models” subservient to formal intelligence are imagined to be heterarchies of automata capable of performing the “symbolic (quasi-spatial) syntheses” of Luria (1973), where “quasi-spatial” points to the abstract core of spatiality: the symbol productions, combinations, and substitutions of algebraic reckoning. The alleged cognitive role of internal “topographic images” and of “efference copies” is confronted with this background and denied.

According to kripke, Wittgenstein denied certain beliefs about meaning and other minds. But who holds these beliefs? we do "not" believe that "all future applications" of a word are "determined"; nor that "i give directions to myself"; nor that something has to "constitute" meaning. Such beliefs are distortions by realist philosophers; it needs no sceptic to deny them. Wittgenstein's "sympathy with the solipsist" is an illusion, Due to misreadings (and mistranslations) of the text. Wittgenstein's position is clear and does not (...) need kripke's revision. (shrink)

According to Ayer, philosophy is an activity of analysis, not a means to truth. First principles and metaphysical truths can neither be established or denied byphilosophical enquiry. He tried to prove that verifibility (whether a proposition can be shown to be true or false) was the key principle of philosophical methodology.

Philosophy unties the knots in our thinking, which we have tangled up in an absurd way; but to do that, it must make movements which are just as complicated as the knots. 1 A claim to know can be contradicted in various ways. Which of them does the sceptic have in mind when he denies that we can know—for example, that the sun will rise tomorrow? Does he mean, perhaps, that the proposition is false—that the sun will not rise tomorrow? (...) The sceptic is in no position to make such a claim. Does he mean that no one can feel certain of the proposition? No; the fact that people feel certain of it is not in dispute. The sceptic's argument is essentially about justification. He claims that we do not have the right to feel certain, nor, therefore, to claim to know. But how can he arrive at this conclusion? (shrink)

Oswald Külpe’s original interpretation of Kant’s philosophy influenced Külpe’s own philosophical thought. On the one hand, Külpe is critical of his illustrious predecessor. For him, in fact, Kant wrongly denies that human thought can address itself to truly non-intuitive objects; furthermore, his transcendental aesthetics is uterly misleading. Interestingly, both claims are supported by Külpe with reference to the psychological research of the time. On the other hand, however, Külpe is highly sympathetic with one of Kant’s central assumptions, namely the (...) unreliability of the internal sense. Against Wundt and other psychologists of his time, Külpe conceives of the epistemological foundations of psychology in accordance with the rehabilitation of this Kantian claim. (shrink)

What is Life? To answer this question, Denis Noble argues that we must look beyond the gene's eye view. For modern 'systems biology' considers life on a variety of levels, as an intricate web of feedback between gene, cell, organ, body, and environment. He shows how it is both a biologically rigorous and richly rewarding way of understanding life.

Wide content and individualist approaches to the individuation of thoughts appear to be incompatible; I think they are not. I propose a criterion for the classification of thoughts which captures both. Thoughts, I claim, should be individuated by their teleological functions. Where teleological function is construed in the standard way - according to the aetiological theory - individuating thoughts by their function cannot produce a classification which is both individualistic and consistent with the principle that sameness of wide content is (...) sufficient for sameness of psychological state. There is, however, an alternative approach to function, the relational theory, which is preferable on independent grounds. A taxonomy of thoughts based on these functions reconciles wide content with individualism. One consequence of individuating thoughts in this way is that intentional content is context sensitive. I discuss some of the implications of context sensitive content. (shrink)

Good explanations are not only true or probably true, but are also relevant to a causal question. Current models of causal explanation either only address the question of the truth of an explanation, or do not distinguish the probability of an explanation from its relevance. The tasks of scenario construction and conversational explanation are distinguished, which in turn shows how scenarios can interact with conversational principles to determine the truth and relevance of explanations. The proposed model distinguishes causal discounting from (...) causal backgrounding , and makes predictions concerning the differential effects of contextual information about alternative explanations on: (a) the kind of mental models constructed; (b) belief revision about probable cause; and (c) the perceived quality of a focal explanation. Four experiments are reported that test these predictions. The significance of the notion of explanatory relevance for research on causal explanation is then discussed. (shrink)

Kant’s ethics conceives of rational beings as autonomous–capable of legislating the moral law, and of motivating themselves to act out of respect for that law. Kant’s ethics also includes a notion of the highest good, the union of virtue with happiness proportional to, and consequent on, virtue. According to Kant, morality sets forth the highest good as an object of the totality of all things good as ends. Much about Kant’s conception of the highest good is controversial. This paper focuses (...) on the apparent conflict between Kant’s claim that we are autonomous, and passages in which he seems to suggest that we require belief in the possibility of the highest good to motivate moral action. I distinguish three distinct versions of these problematic claims that seem to be present in Kant’s texts: that the highest good serves as (1) a motivational supplement to respect for the moral law, (2) a fundamental spring of right action, and (3) a condition of the bindingness of moral requirements. I argue that the texts are better interpreted to yield alternatives to (2) and (3) that do not conflict with our autonomy. I also argue that, properly understood, (1) does not conflict with our autonomy. In arguing for the last claim, I explore Kant’s notion of radical evil and its implications for human agency and virtue. (shrink)

Some Kantian ethicists, myself included, have been trying to show how, contrary to popular belief, Kant makes an important place in his moral theory for emotions–especially love and sympathy. This paper confronts claims of Kant that seem to endorse an absence of sympathetic emotions. I analyze Kant’s accounts of different sorts of emotions (“affects,” “passions,” and “feelings”), and different sorts of emotional coolness (“apathy,” “self-mastery,” and “cold-bloodedness”). I focus on the particular way that Kant praises apathy, as “sublime,” in order (...) to argue that his praise of extreme emotional self-control is not incompatible with, but rather complementary to, his praise of sympathy. (shrink)

Le motif du langage visuel, qui traverse l'ensemble de l'oeuvre de Berkeley, n'est pas seulement le noyau de sa philosophie de la perception. Il est aussi le préréquisit d'une preuve originale de l'existence de Dieu, une évaluation spécifique de la nature de l'expérience commune et de la portée de l'explication scientifique, et il a des conséquences singulières quant à la doctrine de la création du monde. La première conclusion de l'article est qu'en dépit du rejet berkeleyen du mécanisme, on peut (...) avec raison comparer sa pensée avec la conception cybernétique des machines à information; le langage visuel est, dans une certaine mesure, la source d'un réseau global de communication. Mais rien n'est plus important pour Berkeley que la question de la mort, et c'est pourquoi il doit rejeter toute forme d'objectivisme. L'immatérialiste est celui qui affirme que le monde ne peut pas survivre à son propre anéantissement sans l'aide d'un autre esprit, dont la vision est la substance même de toute chose. The design of visual language, which pervades the entire work of Berkeley, is not only the core of his philosophy of perception. It is also the prerequisite of an original proof of God's existence, a specific understanding of both the nature of common experience and the scope of scientific explanation, and it involves unusual consequences upon the doctrine of the creation of the world. The first conclusion of the paper is that, despite Berkeley's rejection of mechanicism, we have a right to confront his views with the cybernetic perspective on information processing machines : visual language is, to a certain extent, the source of a global communication network. But there is nothing more important to Berkeley than the topical question of death, and this is why he is compelled to rejecting whatever kind of objectivism. The immaterialist is he who acknowledges that the world cannot survive his own annihilation without the help of another spirit, whose vision is the very substance of all things. (shrink)

The second part of this publication deals with 1. 17-36 in the unpublished fragment (B), which without doubt form the most original part of the law. For it was not only a question of creating an obstacle to a coup d'État that that would overturn a genuine democracy (represented by a boule and prytaneia of Athenian type, whose members were chosen by lot among the Eretrians), but also of henceforth reestablishing this constitution if a tyranny or oligarchy — interesting association (...) — was imposed by violence. Each citizen was invited to take up arms spontaneously (this clause offered a remarkable dialectical form, a semi-passive participation of Northwestern origin). An eventuality is envisaged of the People being no longer in control of the civic centre, in particular the zone of the boukuterion designated there probably by the term Agoraion (= Metroon at Athens?), or even of them being kept outside the town : in this case the democratie elements should regroup in some part of the territory, a tactic well attested in Greece and even Eretria (the role of the maritime fortress of Porthmos) in order to retake the power. Lastly, sanctions are envisaged against citizens who had not served the cause of the People, while its defenders would be rewarded by the grant of lands and goods belonging to those who had been guilty. A considerable conduding section reviews the principal problems posed by this document : the date, circumstances of its promulgation, place(s) it was exhibited, identity of the legislator, and possible juridical and/or philosophical models. Today it seems certain that the law (necessarily before 336) has to be related to the liberation of Eretria in the autumn of 341, a relatively well documented event. As is a priore probable, an influence by Athenian legislation can be detected in the first part of the text. But a comparison with the celebrated law proposed by Eucrates of Piraeus in 337/6 shows that the Attic model would not account for ail its particularities. The Eretrian law — which is, moreover, the oldest of its kind to have survived on stone — appears radier to be the fruit of an unhappy political experience undergone in the recent past. (shrink)

Direction d'ouvrage, en cours de publication.

L'une des tâches de la philosophie de la biologie contemporaine consiste à rechercher les conditions d'un usage des énoncés fonctionnels dont serait éliminée toute trace de causalité inversée ou d'interprétation mentaliste. Parmi les spécifications de l'idée d'un lien entre fonction et adaptation, la théorie de Millikan est remarquable en ceci qu'elle rend compte du divorce possible entre attribution légitime d'une fonction et absence de l'activité fonctionnelle correspondante, comme dans les cas de maladie ou d'atrophie congénitale. On peut montrer que la (...) distinction essentielle entre causes et moyens peut être comprise à partir d'une référence à l'opposition entre explication en termes de développement et explication en termes de sélection, à condition de reconnoître toute la portée de cette dernière. One aim of contemporary philosophy of biology is to secure a use of functional statements in which there would be no implication of reversed causation or anthropomorphic interpretation. Among the recent alternatives, Millikan's theory is most notable for the way it allows to explain the possible divorce between legitimate functional ascriptions and lack of corresponding functional activity, as in disease or congenital atrophy cases. It is argued that the crucial distinction between causes and means can be better understood with a reference to the contrast between developmental and selectional explanations. (shrink)

Dans L'animal, l'homme, la fonction symbolique , Raymond Ruyer cherchait à caractériser la spécificité de l'homme à l'intérieur du monde biologique et il en distinguait trois traits constitutifs : le rôle modifié du cerveau, la transmission ou « hérédité » culturelle, la dimension symbolique du langage. Sa thèse était qu'il faut chercher dans le maniement des symboles ce qui rend possible les diverses manifestations de la culture, et qu'en vertu de cette origine commune, ces manifestations doivent être considérées comme indissociables. (...) Mais, il y a chez Ruyer, une troisième voie entre émergence et réduction. Il a, en ce qui concerne les symboles, une dette à l'égard de Cassirer et surtout de Susanne Langer. Enfin les acquis en éthologie cognitive et les recherches contemporaines sur l'évolution de la faculté du langage permettent d'apprécier avec quelque scepticisme la position de Ruyer. In Vanimal, Vhomme, la fonction symbolique , Raymond Ruyer tried to define the specificity of man within the biological world, distinguishing three characteristic features: the modified role of the brain, cultural transmission or "heredity", the symbolic dimension of language. He argued that one had to consider the manipulation of symbols as what makes possible the manifestations of culture, and that, because of their common origin, these manifestations should be held to be intricately linked. This paper focuses on the alternative to emergence and reduction that Ruyer intends to define, and elaborates, with respect to symbols, his debt towards Ernst Cassirer and, most notably, Susanne K. Langer. Finally, it provides a skeptical examination of Ruyer's position, drawing on the results of cognitive ethology and on contemporary research on the evolution of the linguistic faculty. (shrink)

Providing an introduction to law in modern society, D. J. Galligan considers how legal theory, and particularly H. L. A Hart's The Concept of Law, has developed the idea of law as a highly developed social system, which has a distinctive character and structure, and which shapes and influences people's behaviour.The concept of law as a distinct social phenomenon is examined through reference to, and analysis of, the work of prominent legal and social theorists, in particular M. Weber, E. Durkheim, (...) and N. Luhmann. Galligan's approach is guided by two main ideas: that the law is a social formation with its own character and features, and that at the same time it interacts with, and is affected by, other aspects of society. In analysing these two ideas, Galligan develops a general framework for law and society within which he considers various aspects including: the nature of social rules and the concept of law as a system of rules; whether law has particular social functions and how legal orders run in parallel; the place of coercion; the characteristic form of modern law and the social conditions that support it; implementation and compliance; and what happens when laws are used to change society.Law in Modern Society encourages legal scholars to consider the law as an expression of social relations, examining the connections and tensions between the positive law of modern society and the spontaneous relations they often try to direct or change. (shrink)

To prove the equivalence one must start with one side, and the earlier-later side seems, for starting with, logically the clearer. The equivalence is provable on reasonable definitions of ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ in terms of the earlier-later structure of time. McTaggart's attempted distinction between the past-present-future A series and the earlier-later B series, as though they were rivals for the structure of time, is based on an unexamined, and false, assumption. The equivalence shows they are not rivals; they are (...) quite consistent with each other. A very serious consequence is that all subsequent argument, from the A side or the B, however sophisticated, is flawed to the extent that it accepts McTaggart's false distinction. (shrink)

Discusses the influential French philosopher, and examines the connections he drew between philosophy and architecture.

Given a class $$\mathcal {C}$$ of models, a binary relation $$\mathcal {R}$$ between models, and a model-theoretic language L, we consider the modal logic and the modal algebra of the theory of $$\mathcal {C}$$ in L where the modal operator is interpreted via $$\mathcal {R}$$. We discuss how modal theories of $$\mathcal {C}$$ and $$\mathcal {R}$$ depend on the model-theoretic language, their Kripke completeness, and expressibility of the modality inside L. We calculate such theories for the submodel and the quotient (...) relations. We prove a downward Löwenheim–Skolem theorem for first-order language expanded with the modal operator for the extension relation between models. (shrink)

Nul ne saurait prédire exactement de quoi demain sera fait. Pourtant le ton d’une époque peut nous avertir, nous faire pressentir ce qui demain pourrait, pourra éventuellement être. Ce « bruit du temps » serait le nom d’un sentiment, d’un trouble, qui déborde la rationalité discur­sive et son pouvoir d’articuler. Une « chose » ressentie, intuitivement, sans savoir encore la dire, qui aurait la propriété étrange et mystérieuse d’annoncer ce qui va venir. La penser, la faire advenir à l’existen...

As much as many other human enterprises, the art world today is fuelled by pride, greed, and ambition. Artists and art dealers hope for recognition and wealth, while art collectors often acquire works less for their intrinsic aesthetic merit than for their investment potential. In such a climate of values and desires, it is not surprising that poseurs and frauds will flourish. For works of painting and sculpture are material objects that derive their often immense monetary value generally from two (...) factors; (1) their aesthetic qualities their embody, and (2) who made them and when. It is the second of these two factors that comes into play in most art hoaxes, which are cases of forgery. (shrink)

I suggest that contemporary economics shares many of the characteristics of methodological behaviourism in psychology, with its emphasis on the influence of motivation, learning, and situational incentives on behaviour, and minimal interest in the details of the cognitive processes that transform input (information) into output (behaviour). The emphasis on these characteristics has the same strengths and weaknesses in economics as in behaviourist psychology.

This contribution to the Common Knowledge symposium on xenophilia examines the life choices of two Jews who loved Christianity. Elijah Zvi Soloveitchik, born into an ultra-Orthodox, nineteenth-century rabbinic dynasty in Lithuania, spent much of his life writing a Hebrew commentary on the Gospels in order to document and argue for the symmetry or symbiosis that he perceived between Judaism and Christianity. Oswald Rufeisen, from a twentieth-century secular Zionist background in Poland, converted to Catholicism during World War II, became a (...) monk, and attempted to immigrate to Israel as a Jew in 1958. Rufeisen, while permitted to move to Israel to join a Carmelite monastery in Haifa, was denied the right to immediate citizenship of Israel which the Law of Return guarantees to all bona fide Jews. And this particular Soloveitchik has largely been forgotten, given the limits of Jewish interest in the New Testament and of Christian attention to rabbinic literature. This article explores the complex and vexing questions that the careers of these two men raise about the elusive distinctions between Judaism and Christianity, on the one hand, and, on the other, between the Jewish religion and Jewish national identity. (shrink)

Kathy Wilkes contributed to two books on Goal-directed Behaviour and Modelling the Mind based on interdisciplinary graduate classes at Oxford during the 1980s. In this article, I assess her contributions to those discussions. She championed the school of philosophers who prefer problem dissolution to problem-solution. She also addressed the problem of realism in psychology. But the contribution that has turned out to be most relevant to subsequent work was her idea that in modelling the mind, we might need to “use (...) as structural elements synthetic cells, or things that behaved very like neurones.” I show how this idea has been developed in my own recent work with zoologist and neuroscientist, Raymond Noble, to become a possible physiological basis for the ability of organisms to choose between alternative actions, and so become active agents. I consider that this insight became her seminal contribution in this field. (shrink)